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Abstract 
Despite the growing importance of geographical indications (GI), relatively little attention has 
been devoted to studying the optimal size of a GI region, as well as how lobbying by interest 
groups may affect the actual size. We develop a political economy model of the size of 
geographical indications, taking into account possible effects on perceived quality as well as on 
cost sharing among producers. We show that the political process may result in a GI area that is 
smaller or larger than the social optimum, not just depending on the relative political influence of 
existing and potential producers, but also on how changes in quality affect consumer welfare. 
 
 
 
The authors thank Julian Alston, Paola Corsinovi, Giulia Meloni, Erik Schokkaert, Thijs 
Vandemoortele, Frank Verboven and Steve Ziliak for insightful comments and discussion. All 
remaining errors are our own. This research was financed with Methusalem funding of the KU 
Leuven Research Council. 
  
 2 
 
Introduction 
A geographical indication (GI) is a collective label, backed by government regulation, to certify 
the geographical origins of a product. GIs are used for a wide variety of products and the number 
of GIs has been growing steadily. In parallel with the growing importance of GIs, several authors 
have explored the economics of GIs, with some positing welfare gains due to the resolution of 
asymmetric information problems (e.g. Moschini et al., 2008) and others claiming that GIs can 
be used as tools for extracting rents from consumers, e.g. by systematically oversupplying 
quality (Mérel and Sexton, 2012). 
 Geographical indications are in the midst of at least three distinct debates.  A first debate 
concerns the actual link between the quality of a product and the location or “terroir” where it is 
produced. The debate about terroir is important given the strong emphasis in existing GI 
regulations on the link between the geographical area and the product for which a GI is 
requested. For instance, the World Trade Organization’s definition of a GI (as part of the TRIPS 
agreement on intellectual property) requires that the product possess a “given quality, reputation, 
or other characteristic” that is “essentially attributable to its geographical origin” (WTO, 1994; 
Marette et al., 2008). However, existing empirical evidence on the link between “terroir” and 
quality is mixed. Gergaud and Ginsburgh (2008) found that price and quality measures of 
Bordeaux wines are influenced by technological choices more than by the “terroir” of the 
vineyard. By contrast, Ashenfelter and Storchmann (2010) found that physical site attributes as 
well as solar radiation are important determinants of vineyard quality in the Mosel Valley. In a 
study of vineyard sales prices in the Willamette Valley in Oregon, Cross et al. (2011) find that 
physical site attributes (such as slope, elevation, or soil quality) do not explain observed sales 
prices. On the other hand, they find that prices of vineyards are strongly influenced by whether 
they are located in a GI. These results suggest that the expected revenues of a vineyard depend 
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more on the collective label of the GI than on the actual intrinsic qualities of the wine as 
determined by “terroir”. 
A second debate concerns the status of geographical indications in international trade. 
While some countries consider GIs to be a way to solve information problems, other countries 
interpret GIs as an unnecessary protection of producers from an established region against new 
entrants from a different region. These differences of opinion have led to what Josling (2006) 
described as a “war on terroir” in the context of WTO negotiations. 
 A third debate, which so far has not received much academic attention, concerns the 
question of how large the optimal area of a GI should be. The delimitation of GI areas occurs 
through government regulation.
1
 Like other policy decisions, the choice of the size of the GI area 
can have both welfare and distributional consequences, which will tend to influence decision 
making. 
 The history of the Champagne GI offers a clear example. In the early 20
th
 century, when 
the Champagne region was officially delimited for the first time, there were major disputes over 
the precise definition of the area. The original proposal included only villages in the Marne 
department, while producers in the neighboring Aube department claimed that they should also 
be included. The disagreement led to bitter conflicts, eventually erupting into violence in 1911 
(Simpson, 2011). In recent years, the expansion of the Champagne area is again on the agenda. 
Given that vineyards in Champagne can fetch prices of €1 million per hectare or more compared 
to prices of around €4000 per hectare outside the region, there is clearly a lot at stake (Stevenson, 
                                                          
1 In France, for instance, a request to create or change a GI area needs to be submitted at the Institut National 
d’Appellations d’Origine (INAO), which appoints a committee to study the request. The committee eventually 
proposes a delimitation of the GI area, which is then subject to a “national opposition procedure” whereby any 
interested party can voice complaints regarding the proposed GI area. In the end, INAO decides on the delimitation 
of the GI area which is then sent to the Ministry of Agriculture for approval. Since 2008, the European Commission 
ultimately approves or disapproves the proposed GI area after consulting the EU Member States. 
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2008). A crucial question regarding GIs is therefore how large the optimal area of a GI should 
be, and how the political process determines the actual area.  
 In this paper we develop a political economy model which incorporates four salient facts 
about GIs. First, an expansion of the GI area leads to an expansion of total production which 
depresses the price of the GI product (assuming demand is not perfectly elastic). Second, an 
expansion of the GI area means that certain fixed costs incurred by the GI area (such as costs for 
marketing) can be spread over a larger number of producers, thus reducing the cost for existing 
producers. Third, the expansion of the GI area may have a negative effect on (actual or 
perceived) quality, whether because of an actual decline in the intrinsic quality of the product as 
the area expands (due to e.g. differences in “terroir”) or because a larger area almost by 
definition is less “typical” of a given geographical area. Fourth, the decision over the size of the 
GI area is taken by government bodies which may be influenced by various interest groups, and 
a political economy perspective is thus necessary to study the outcome. We model the political 
decision over the GI area as the maximization of a weighted objective function by the 
government, with different weights representing different degrees of political influence. We 
show under which conditions the political equilibrium would be closer or further away from the 
social optimum. A general conclusion is that the politically determined GI region may be too 
large or too small from a social welfare perspective.  
The question of how the size of a GI is determined has not received much attention in the 
literature, with the exception of Landi and Stefani (2013) and Langinier and Babcock (2010). 
Our model incorporates the effects identified by these authors but expands the analysis in several 
ways. First, the model of Landi and Stefani (2013) does not allow for decreases in quality as the 
GI region expands. Yet, in reality, an expansion is often criticized on the grounds that it would 
adversely affect quality. If this quality argument is correct, an expansion of the GI area might be 
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a bad idea from the point of view of social welfare and not merely from the point of view of the 
existing producers. Moreover, Landi and Stefani (2013) do not take into account possible “cost 
sharing” effects of a GI region, where certain fixed costs for marketing or certification are shared 
by producers. Langinier and Babcock (2010) do take into account the ‘cost sharing’ effect of an 
expansion of the GI area, which they model as a club which enables its members to distinguish 
themselves from low quality producers. However, this setup does not lend itself well to 
analyzing an actual expansion of a GI area. Once a GI area is defined, entry is free in the sense 
that any producer inside the region who meets the criteria can obtain GI status (Moschini et al., 
2008). Moreover, in reality the size of GI areas is determined by government agencies, not by 
producers.  
Our paper is organized as follows. After discussing the general setup and deriving the 
effects of a change in the GI area on the welfare of consumers and of producers inside and 
outside of the GI region, we determine the socially optimal size of a GI region and show how it 
depends on the relative size of the negative “quality” effect and the positive “output” effect of an 
expansion on consumer welfare, as well as on the magnitude of variable costs related to 
managing the GI area. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2008, 2011), we then model the political decision over the GI area as the 
maximization of a weighted objective function by the government, with different weights 
representing different degrees of political influence. To compare the social optimum with the 
political equilibrium, we consider several possible cases of influence of interest groups, studying 
the case where the government maximizes aggregate producer welfare (treating ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ as equal), as well as the cases where the government maximizes only ‘insider’ 
welfare or (for illustrative purposes) the unlikely case where the government maximizes only 
‘outsider’ welfare. We show how the political equilibrium can graphically be represented as 
 6 
 
being a weighted combination of these extreme scenarios, and discuss how the political 
equilibrium compares to the social optimum. Next, we discuss a number of issues related to the 
role of non-GI production, the effects of international trade, and the possibility of discontinuous 
changes in quality. A final section concludes by offering some policy implications. 
The Model 
Producers 
Consider a region with a continuum of producers indexed by their distance 𝑖 from the center of 
the region. All producers in the region produce the same product but vary in the quality of their 
production. We assume that their quality level can be represented by a continuous “quality 
function” 𝜎(𝑖) > 0 which is decreasing as we move away from the center of the region (𝜎𝑖 <
0).2   
We thus assume that the quality of a producer is given exogenously and depends only on 
the location of the producer – i.e. whether the producer is located close to the center of the region 
or rather on the periphery.
3
 The assumption that the quality of a producer depends only on his 
location is a simplification which can be defended on two grounds. First, there could be objective 
aspects of the region, such as the soil, the micro-climate, local traditions or other factors which 
strongly influence the actual quality of the product. It is precisely this emphasis on the 
importance of “terroir” which underlies the official regulations regarding GIs. Second, even if 
there was no real link between “terroir” and the objectively verifiable qualities of a product, 
consumers might attach intrinsic value to the region where the product originates from. In this 
case, the geographical indication would serve as a guarantee that the product is indeed typical of 
                                                          
2
 Throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
3
 We abstract from the possibility that producers themselves can make a choice over the level of quality to be 
attained, or that the governing body of the geographical indication sets quality standards (as in Mérel and Sexton, 
2012). 
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the region. To the extent that the intrinsic quality of the product is determined by “terroir”, it is 
clear that increasing a GI region at some point must mean that the soil, climate, local traditions 
or other factors which constitute “terroir” become less suitable to create a qualitative product. 
Even if “terroir” is unimportant to intrinsic quality, an expansion of the region may decrease the 
perceived quality for consumers if they attach importance to the degree to which a product is 
typical of a certain region. For instance, if the Champagne region were defined so broadly as to 
cover the whole of France, the geographical indication “Champagne” would probably lose much 
of its appeal as well as the corresponding price premium, even if the intrinsic quality of sparkling 
wine remained the same.
4
 
The delineation of a geographical indication (GI) by deciding on its area implicitly 
determines output and average quality.
5
 To keep the model simple, we assume that producers 
have a fixed and identical productivity of one unit per unit of land. Given this assumption, 
aggregate production is equal to the total area of the GI region, and we will use the symbol 𝑥 to 
denote both. Average quality is then given by 𝑠(𝑥) =
1
𝑥
∫ 𝜎(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
𝑥
0
. Since quality 𝜎(𝑖) is 
decreasing in 𝑖, the same is true for average quality as a function of total area: 𝑠𝑥 < 0. 
 Following Moschini et al. (2008) and Langinier and Babcock (2010), we assume that 
managing the GI region implies costs of 𝐹 + 𝑐𝑥 where 𝐹 represents fixed costs (e.g. marketing 
expenses) and 𝑐 denotes variable costs (e.g. certification costs). Following Moschini et al. 
(2008), we assume that these costs are borne by the producers in proportion to their output: GI 
producers pay a per-unit charge of 𝑐 +
𝐹
𝑥
. For simplicity, we assume that production itself is 
                                                          
4
 Other mechanisms might have a similar effect. For instance, there could be an indirect effect working through total 
quantity produced (e.g. increased availability turning the product into a commodity instead of an exclusive product) 
or through the total number of producers (e.g. free riding problems), both of which would in turn be a function of the 
size of the area. 
5 While we use the term “area”, the model is best thought of as measuring the GI on a line (as shown in the Figures). 
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costless, and we normalize the profits of producers outside the GI region to zero. In a GI region 
with area 𝑥, producer surplus is then given by  
 Π𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
 (1) 
for a GI “insider” at distance 𝑖, and zero for a GI “outsider”. The aggregate surplus of insiders for 
a given area 𝑥 is given by  
 Π𝐼(𝑥) = ∫ Π𝑖(𝑥)𝑑𝑖
𝑥
0
= (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥 − 𝐹 (2) 
Consumers 
We assume that without a geographical indication standard, consumers are unable to distinguish 
products from different producers and/or from different regions. With a geographical indication 
standard, by contrast, consumers can distinguish between products from the GI region and those 
from outside, but they are still unable to discriminate between different producers inside the GI. 
Consumers value quality, but since they cannot distinguish producers within a region, their 
perceived quality is the average quality 𝑠 of producers in the GI region. We assume that 
consumer utility of a representative consumer is given by a utility function 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) where utility 
is concave in both quantity 𝑥 and quality 𝑠 (𝑢𝑥 > 0, 𝑢𝑥𝑥 < 0, 𝑢𝑠 > 0, 𝑢𝑠𝑠 < 0).
6 Moreover, we 
assume that a higher quality level increases the marginal utility of consumption (𝑢𝑥𝑠 > 0). Given 
these assumptions, the consumer maximizes consumer surplus  
 Π𝐶 = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) − 𝑝𝑥 (3) 
leading to an inverse demand function of the form  
 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑠) = 𝑢𝑥(𝑥, 𝑠) (4) 
                                                          
6
 Alternatively, we could work directly with an inverse demand curve as in Spence (1975). Working with the utility 
function makes the notation easier, however. 
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As a result of our assumptions on the utility function, the demand curve is downward sloping 
(𝑝𝑥 < 0) and shifts upward if quality increases (𝑝𝑠 > 0).  
Impact of a Change in the GI Area 
How does a change in the GI area (𝑥) affect producer surplus? To assess this, we distinguish 
between the effects on existing producers (insiders) and new entrants (outsiders). The effect of 
an increase in the area on insider surplus is 
 
𝜕Π𝐼
𝜕𝑥
= ∫
𝜕Π𝑖
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝑖
𝑥
0
= 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) +
𝐹
𝑥
 (5) 
An increase in the GI area depresses insiders’ revenues (first term) while it leads to better cost 
sharing (second term). The first term, 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥), is negative since an increase in the area 
leads to a higher quantity, which induces a lower price (𝑝𝑥 < 0); in addition, the increase in the 
area leads to a lower quality which is also associated with a lower price (𝑠𝑥 < 0). Graphically, 
the first effect is the result of a downward movement along the demand curve while the second 
effect is the result of a downward shift of the demand curve. The second term, 
𝐹
𝑥
, is positive and 
captures the fact that an expansion of production reduces the per-unit charge of existing 
producers. 
An expansion of the GI area implies that some former “outsiders” can now sell their 
product under the GI label but have to pay the per-unit charge 𝑐 +
𝐹
𝑥
. For an infinitesimal 
increase in the area, the change in surplus for the marginal outsider who enters the GI region is 
given by 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
. The surplus for all other outsiders remains zero. The effect of an increase in 
𝑥 on the aggregate surplus of outsiders is thus given by 
 
𝜕Π𝑂
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
 (6) 
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Combining these effects, the effect of a change in the GI area on aggregate producer surplus is 
given by 
 
𝜕Π𝑃
𝜕𝑥
=
𝜕Π𝐼
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕Π𝑂
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)  (7) 
The effect of a change in the area on consumer surplus is given by 
 
𝜕Π𝐶
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 − 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) (8) 
The first term, 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥, represents the direct utility impact of the change in average quality as a 
result of the increase in area. This term is negative since an increase in the area decreases 
average quality. The second term, 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) , is the marginal change in consumer 
expenditures, which has a positive effect on consumer surplus since prices go down if the GI 
area increases.  
The Socially Optimal Area 
As a benchmark to compare the political equilibrium to, we first derive the socially optimal area. 
Social welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate producer surplus:  
 𝑊 = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠) − 𝑐𝑥 − 𝐹 (9) 
Maximizing with respect to area 𝑥, the first order condition is 
 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑢𝑥 + 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 − 𝑐 = 0  (10) 
We thus see that the “rent transfer” 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) cancels out. Equation (10) defines the optimal 
area 𝑥∗ of the GI region, assuming that the resulting social welfare is positive, i.e. 𝑢(𝑥∗, 𝑠) −
𝑐𝑥∗ ≥ 𝐹.  
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An increase in the area 𝑥 affects social welfare in three ways. First, it increases aggregate 
production 𝑥 which has a positive effect on utility. Second, the increase in area reduces the 
average quality (𝑠𝑥 < 0) which has a negative effect on utility. Third, the expansion of 
production means that extra variable costs 𝑐 will be incurred. The optimal area of the GI 
balances these three effects. 
Using the fact that 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑝, equation (10) defines an interesting relationship between price 
and marginal cost: 
 𝑝 − 𝑐 = −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥  (11) 
Figure 1 shows this relationship, denoting the social optimum by x∗. The resulting consumer 
price p∗ is above the marginal cost c of operating the GI region. Equation (11) can be rewritten 
as: 
 
𝑝−𝑐
𝑝
= −
𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
  (12) 
That is, in the social welfare optimum, the markup of price over marginal cost should equal the 
relative effect on consumer utility of the change in quality (𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥) and the change in quantity 
(𝑢𝑥). Since all other terms are positive, the markup in the optimum will be positive if 𝑠𝑥 < 0, as 
shown in Figure 1. By contrast, if there is no quality effect (𝑠𝑥 = 0), the optimal markup is zero. 
In that case, the welfare optimum is to expand the GI region until price equals marginal cost.  
Importantly, the markup does not arise because of the need to offer incentives to 
producers, as both quality and quantity are exogenously given. Rather, because quality effects of 
a further expansion would negatively affect consumer surplus, the optimal area will be smaller 
than what would be necessary to drive prices down to the marginal cost of operating the GI 
region. In short, if quality depends on the area of the GI region, the socially optimal GI region 
implies rents for producers in the GI region, shown in Figure 1 by the shaded area.  
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However, this result needs to be qualified in two ways. First, if producers are forced to 
bear the fixed costs themselves, they will only benefit if the rents exceed the fixed cost ((𝑝 −
𝑐)𝑥∗ ≥ 𝐹). By contrast, from a social welfare perspective, the GI region is beneficial as soon as 
the sum of consumer surplus and producer rents exceeds the fixed cost (i.e. 𝑢(𝑥∗, 𝑠) − 𝑐𝑥∗ ≥
𝐹).7 The social planner would thus be willing to introduce GI regions where producer rents are 
smaller than the fixed cost, as long as the difference is made up by consumer surplus. But in 
those cases, producers would not be willing to implement the GI region. The practical 
implementation of the GI region would then necessitate government intervention, e.g. by 
subsidizing the fixed costs of operating the region.
8
  
A second qualification is that our result of rents accruing to the producers depends on our 
assumption of exogenously given quantities. A typical assumption in the literature is that 
producers are perfectly competitive inside the GI region (e.g. Mérel and Sexton, 2012; Moschini 
et al., 2008), which implies that rents will be competed away. On the other hand, since land is the 
scarce factor of supply, there would still be some rents captured by the landowners (Moschini et 
al., 2008). As we see here, this result may be consistent with social welfare maximization. 
The Political Equilibrium 
Given the conflicting interests of consumers, “insider” producers, and “outsider” producers, the 
question is how the actual size of a GI region will be determined by the government. We study 
this question using the political economy approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), first 
applied to quality and standards by Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008, 2011). We follow this 
approach in assuming that the government maximizes its own objective function, which consists 
                                                          
7
 Since the curve labeled 𝑝 in Figure 1 captures both the quality and quantity effect, it is not possible to interpret the 
triangle below p as consumer surplus (which is defined for a constant quality level). 
8 
Similar results can be found regarding optimal product variety in the presence of fixed costs; see Spence (1976).  
 13 
 
of a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions from interest groups. The government can 
only use one instrument, the total area 𝑥 of the GI region. We assume that producers inside an 
existing GI region are politically organized, as are the “outsiders”, but consumers are not 
organized.
9
  
 Our approach in modeling the lobbying process requires some modifications compared to 
the traditional models following Grossman and Helpman (1994), which assume fixed and 
exogenously given lobbying groups. By contrast, in the present setting, interest groups change as 
the GI area expands or shrinks. For our definition of the lobbying group of the insiders we will 
assume that as new producers are added to the GI area, the corresponding group of insiders 
increases gradually in the process.
10
 The “insider” interest group uses a truthful contribution 
schedule of the form 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{0, Π𝐼(𝑥) − 𝑏𝐼} defined over the different possible values 𝑥 
of the area of the GI region. In this formulation, 𝑏𝐼 is a constant, representing a minimum level 
of profits the interest group does not wish to spend on lobbying. 
Likewise, our definition of the lobbying group of the outsiders needs some care. In 
particular, increasing the size of the GI region from an area 𝑥0 to an area 𝑥1 only affects 
outsiders located in this interval and has no effect on outsiders located beyond 𝑥1. As a result 
producers beyond 𝑥1 have no reason to lobby for an increase in the area to 𝑥1. Taking this 
argument to its logical conclusion, every outsider is willing to make a personal contribution only 
to have the GI area expanded to include just himself. Given that joining the GI region leads to a 
profit increase of (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
) for an outsider, this will be the maximum an outsider is willing to 
pay. The marginal contribution of outsiders just outside area 𝑥 thus equals (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
). The 
                                                          
9
 This does not affect our results. As the government maximizes a weighted sum, what matters are the relative 
weights. 
10
 For instance, the interests of existing GI producers are often represented by a producer organization managing the 
GI region. Expanding the region would then naturally expand the membership of this organization. 
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lobby group of the outsiders can then be thought of as a continuum of producers, each willing to 
pay (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
) if the area is expanded to include himself. We therefore write the total 
contribution of the outsiders as 𝐶𝑂(𝑥) = ∫ (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
) 𝑑𝑖
𝑥
𝑥0
 starting from an initial area 𝑥0. 
The government’s objective function Π𝐺(𝑥) is a weighted sum of the interest group 
contributions weighted by their relative lobbying strength (assumed exogenously given), and 
social welfare:
11
 
 ΠG(𝑥) = 𝛼𝐼𝐶𝐼(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑂𝐶𝑂(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑊𝑊(𝑥) (13) 
The government chooses the size of the GI region to maximize its objective function (13). Each 
possible size of the GI region corresponds to a certain level of profits for insiders and outsiders, 
and hence also to a certain level of contributions. The government receives higher contributions 
from an interest group if the proposed size of the GI region creates higher profits for that group. 
Therefore maximizing the contributions from one interest group is equivalent to maximizing 
their profits. The government’s optimal GI region is defined by the following first order 
condition:
12
 
 
𝜕ΠG(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝛼𝐼
𝜕ΠI(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
+ 𝛼𝑂 (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
) + 𝛼𝑊
𝜕𝑊(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 0 (14) 
To understand the general political equilibrium, it is instructive to consider three special cases. 
The first case is where the government aims to maximize aggregate producer welfare, 
corresponding to a situation where 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 > 0 and 𝛼𝑊 = 0 in equation (14). The second case 
is where the government focuses only on maximizing insider producer welfare, which would be 
                                                          
11
 In the traditional formulation, 𝛼𝑊 = 1. However, it aids our exposition if we explicitly attach a weight to social 
welfare. Since what matters are the relative weights, this does not influence the results. 
12
 If the lobbying strength of insiders and outsiders is zero (𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 = 0), this reduces to
𝜕𝑊(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 0 and the political 
equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. 
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the case if 𝛼𝐼 > 0 while 𝛼𝑂 = 𝛼𝑊 = 0. Conversely, the third case is where the government only 
maximizes the welfare of outsider producers, corresponding to 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑊 = 0 and 𝛼𝑂 > 0. We 
discuss these three cases in turn, and then present the political equilibrium in the more general 
case. 
Maximizing Aggregate Producer Welfare 
If insiders and outsiders have equal lobbying weight, while the government is not concerned at 
all with social welfare, maximizing the government’s objective function is equivalent to 
maximizing aggregate producer welfare. The first order condition is 
 
𝜕Π𝑃
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑝 + 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) − 𝑐 = 0 (15) 
The first term gives the positive impact on aggregate producer revenues of the extra production 
made possible by expanding the GI area. The second term denotes the negative impact on 
aggregate producer revenues caused by the expansion of the GI area. The third term denotes the 
increase in variable costs due to an increased area. The optimal area from the point of view of 
aggregate producer welfare thus balances these effects. The situation is depicted in Figure 2, 
denoting the resulting area by 𝑥𝑃. As shown, compared to the social optimum, two effects play a 
role, which we call “rent-seeking through quantity” (denoted by A in Figure 2) and “rent-seeking 
through quality” (B).  
To see both effects algebraically, we can rearrange the first order condition to give 
 
𝑝−𝑐
𝑝
= −
𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
−
1
𝜂𝐷
− (
𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
−
𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
) (16) 
The first term reflects the markup which would hold in the social optimum (see equation (12)). 
The other terms reflect how this optimal markup is distorted by aggregate producer welfare 
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maximization. The second term, −
1
𝜂𝐷
, is the traditional “inverse elasticity” rule, reflecting “rent-
seeking through quantity”. This term will always tend to increase the markup relative to the 
social optimum. Notice that if there was no quality effect (𝑠𝑥 = 0), the GI region would still be 
set to lead to a markup of −
1
𝜂𝐷
 and hence rents for producers. The “rent-seeking through 
quantity” effect (A) will thus always tend to decrease the area, as a smaller area implies a 
restriction of production and thus a higher producer price, ceteris paribus. 
The third term, − (
𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
−
𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥
𝑢𝑥
), captures the “rent-seeking through quality” effect (B) 
and could be positive or negative, depending on whether the price effect dominates the direct 
utility effect or not. Producers do not take into account the effect of lower quality on consumer 
utility (𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥), but only its effect on price through consumers’ marginal willingness to pay 
(𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥). Depending on how a change in quality affects demand, the impact on price may be 
larger or smaller than the impact on consumer utility. If a decrease in quality reduces prices 
strongly, producers will prefer a smaller region even if there is only a limited effect on consumer 
utility. The resulting area will be socially suboptimal. Conversely, if lower quality does not 
affect prices but strongly affects consumer utility, the preferred area of producers will be larger 
than what is socially optimal. Thus, the “rent-seeking through quality” effect can go in the 
direction of increasing or decreasing the area, depending on how changes in quality affect utility 
and prices. 
Maximizing Insider Welfare 
If insiders have positive lobbying weight (𝛼𝐼 > 0) while outsiders have zero lobbying weight 
and the government is not concerned with social welfare (𝛼𝑂 = 𝛼𝑊 = 0), the government would 
set the GI region to maximize insider welfare. The corresponding first order condition is 
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𝜕Π𝐼
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) +
𝐹
𝑥
= 0 (17) 
The first term is the marginal effect on insider revenues of expanding the GI region. Since 
expansion leads to lower prices, while the output of insiders remains constant, this effect is 
always negative. The second term is the cost sharing effect.  
If the cost sharing effect was absent, the effect of an expansion on insider surplus would 
always be negative. Insiders would have an incentive to try to get rid of the producers at the 
periphery, as this would at the same time raise average quality and restrict quantity and thus 
increase the price for the remaining producers. Equation (17) would in that case imply a 
continuously shrinking GI area. External economies of scale in cost sharing prevent this.  
Comparing equation (15) maximizing aggregate producer welfare with equation (17)  
maximizing insider welfare, we see that producers now equate −𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) with 
𝐹
𝑥
 instead of 
with 𝑝 − 𝑐. The situation is depicted in Figure 3. The area 𝑥𝐼, defined by equation (17), is 
smaller than area 𝑥𝑃, an effect labeled C in the figure.13 
Maximizing Outsider Welfare 
The third special case of equation (14) is when the government is only concerned with the 
outsiders. Maximizing the government’s objective function then leads to 
 𝑝 − 𝑐 =
𝐹
𝑥
 (18) 
                                                          
13
 In theory, it is possible that 𝑥𝐼 lies to the right of 𝑥𝑃. However, in that case, the curve 
𝐹
𝑥
 would lie above 𝑝 − 𝑐, 
which implies that 𝐹 > (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥 for both 𝑥𝑃 and 𝑥𝐼. Since producers would not be able to cover their fixed costs, 
they would not implement the GI area. Hence, if the GI area is implemented at all, it must be the case that the group 
of insider producers prefers a smaller GI area than that which would maximize aggregate producer surplus. As 
demonstrated in the Appendix, when outsiders can make side payments to the insiders, the insiders fully internalize 
the effects of an expansion on outsiders. As a result, maximizing insider welfare becomes equivalent with 
maximizing aggregate producer welfare and the resulting equilibria are the same. 
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That is, if the government maximizes outsider welfare, the result is an equilibrium where the 
rents 𝑝 − 𝑐 are just sufficient to cover fixed costs. In Figure 3, the resulting equilibrium (denoted 
by 𝑥𝑂) corresponds to the right-most intersection of 𝑝 − 𝑐 and 
𝐹
𝑥
. Interestingly, if there is no 
quality effect (𝑠𝑥 = 0), the social optimum would be 𝑝 − 𝑐 = 0 and 𝑥
𝑂 would be too small from 
a social welfare perspective.
14
 If there is a quality effect, 𝑥𝑂 can either be too large or too small 
depending on whether −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 intersects 𝑝 − 𝑐 to the left or to the right of 𝑥
𝑂. However, if the 
social optimum 𝑥∗ is greater than 𝑥𝑂, producers cannot recover their fixed costs in the social 
optimum.  
Given that outsiders are a heterogeneous group and hence probably less organized than 
the insiders, it may seem unrealistic to assume that the government would give consideration 
only to outsiders. However, this case is in fact equivalent to a situation where the government 
lets anyone join the GI region who wishes to do so (and who is willing to pay the per-unit charge 
𝑐 +
𝐹
𝑥
). The expansion would continue until at the margin, joining the GI region does not bring 
extra profits for producers. The case where outsider welfare is maximized can thus be interpreted 
as an “open access” equilibrium. 
To summarize, the three special cases lead to a clear ranking: we find that 𝑥𝐼 < 𝑥𝑃 < 𝑥𝑂. 
However, with respect to the social welfare optimum 𝑥∗ the conclusions are less clear-cut. Since 
−𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 and 𝑝 − 𝑐 may intersect anywhere, the social welfare optimum could be smaller than 𝑥
𝐼, 
larger than 𝑥𝑂, or anywhere in between. 
                                                          
14
 This result follows from our assumption that the fixed cost 𝐹 is financed using a per-unit charge, effectively 
transforming a fixed cost into a marginal cost, and thus restricting production. A similar result can be found in 
Moschini et al. (2008). 
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The Political Equilibrium 
Having studied the three special cases, we now turn to the political equilibrium in general, i.e. for 
arbitrary values of the lobbying weights 𝛼𝐼 and 𝛼𝑂 and the weight attached to social welfare 𝛼𝑊. 
Substituting the appropriate expressions in equation (14), maximization of the government’s 
objective function implies 
 
𝜕ΠG(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝛼𝐼 (𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) +
𝐹
𝑥
) + 𝛼𝑂 (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
) + 𝛼𝑊(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥) = 0 (19) 
We normalize the weight 𝛼𝑊 = 1, divide through by (1 + 𝛼𝐼) and rearrange: 
 (
𝛼𝐼−𝛼𝑂
1+𝛼𝐼
) (
𝐹
𝑥
) + (
1+𝛼𝑂
1+𝛼𝐼
) (𝑝 − 𝑐) = (
𝛼𝐼
1+𝛼𝐼
) (−𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥)) + (
1
1+𝛼𝐼
) (−𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥) (20) 
To interpret this expression, note that the left-hand side is a weighted sum of 
𝐹
𝑥
 and 𝑝 − 𝑐. 
Likewise, the right-hand side is a weighted sum of −𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) and −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥. These 
components all have a clear graphical interpretation, as discussed in earlier sections. If we 
assume that the lobbying strength of insiders is greater than that of outsiders (𝛼𝐼 > 𝛼𝑂), the 
weights on both sides of the equation are between zero and one, and sum up to one. We can then 
interpret the political equilibrium 𝑥# as the intersection of two curves, both of which are a 
“weighted average” of curves already encountered previously. Figure 4 shows this graphically.  
The first panel of Figure 4 shows the right-hand side of equation (20) as a weighted 
average of −𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) and −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥. If the lobbying power of insiders is zero (𝛼
𝐼 = 0), this 
curve coincides with −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥, the direct utility impact of a decrease in quality. By contrast, as the 
lobbying power of insiders grows, the curve moves closer to −𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥), the negative price 
impact of an increased GI region through expanded quantity and lower quality.  
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The second panel of Figure 4 shows how the left-hand side of equation (20) can be seen 
as a weighted combination of 
𝐹
𝑥
 and 𝑝 − 𝑐. If outsiders and insiders have equal lobbying weights 
(𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂), the left-hand side coincides with 𝑝 − 𝑐. If insiders have greater lobbying weight 
(𝛼𝐼 > 𝛼𝑂), the left-hand side would converge on 
𝐹
𝑥
 as 𝛼𝐼 grows larger. 
When outsiders have greater lobbying power than insiders, and 𝛼𝑂 grows larger, the left-
hand side of equation (20) would no longer lie in-between 
F
x
 and p − c. To see what happens if 
𝛼𝑂 grows large, multiply both sides by 
1+𝛼𝐼
1+𝛼𝑂
. The right-hand side then converges to zero while 
the left-hand side converges on (p − c −
F
x
). Hence, this scenario results in the condition 
p − c =
F
x
, which defines the “open access” equilibrium xO.  
The third panel of Figure 4 shows how the combination of the two “weighted” curves 
determines the political equilibrium. Although the exact optimum depends on the specifics of the 
lobbying weights, it is clear that the special cases we considered earlier, as well as the social 
welfare optimum, are boundary solutions. Our political economy approach thus defines the 
political equilibrium 𝑥# as lying somewhere in between four extreme cases, corresponding to the 
social welfare optimum 𝑥∗, the optimum for aggregate producer surplus 𝑥𝑃, the optimum for the 
insiders 𝑥𝐼 and the “open access” outcome 𝑥𝑂.  
Comparison of the Social Optimum and the Political Equilibrium 
To see when the political equilibrium would be below or above the social optimum, we can 
evaluate the derivative of the government’s objective function at the social optimum 𝑥∗: 
 
𝜕ΠG(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
= 𝛼𝐼
𝜕ΠI(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
+ 𝛼𝑂 (𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥∗
) (21) 
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If this expression is zero, then the political equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum; 
if positive, the political equilibrium would set a GI area greater than the social optimum, and if 
negative, the political equilibrium will be smaller than the social optimum.  
Clearly, the expression will be zero if 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 = 0 (i.e. the government is not influenced 
by lobbying). To get more insight, we study the case where the government assigns equal weight 
to insiders and outsiders (𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 > 0). In this case the expression becomes 
𝜕Π𝑃(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
= 𝑝 −
𝑐 + 𝑥∗(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥). By definition, at the social optimum 𝑥
∗ we have 𝑝 − 𝑐 = −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥, and we get   
 
𝜕ΠG(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
= −𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 + 𝑥
∗(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) (22) 
If insiders and outsiders have equal lobbying weight, the derivative of the government’s 
objective function is thus equal to minus the derivative of consumer surplus, −
𝜕Π𝐶(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
. The 
political equilibrium coincides with the social optimum only if it also coincides with the 
consumer’s optimum. This result is due to the fact that at the social optimum, 
𝜕𝑊(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
=
𝜕Π𝐶(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
+
𝜕Π𝐼(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
+
𝜕Π𝑂(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
= 0. If 
𝜕Π𝐶(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
= 0, the social optimum implies 
𝜕Π𝐼(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
=
−
𝜕Π𝑂(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥∗
. If insiders and outsiders have equal lobbying weight, this in turn means that their 
lobbying efforts exactly offset each other, so that the social optimum is the political equilibrium. 
This is by no means true in general, and the political equilibrium may end up being greater or 
smaller than the social optimum. 
 A different way of looking at the case with 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 is in terms of the “rent-seeking 
through quality” and “rent-seeking through quantity” effects introduced earlier. While the rent-
seeking through quantity effect will always tend to restrict the GI area, the rent-seeking through 
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quality effect might go both ways, depending on whether the direct utility impact of a change in 
quality (𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥) is greater or smaller than the price effect (𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥). Clearly, this depends on the 
specifics of consumer demand, and no general statements are possible. However, if we take an 
“neutral” approach and assume that changes in quality lead to parallel shifts in demand, so that 
𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥 and 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 cancel out, the “rent-seeking through quality” effect would be zero. In this 
scenario, the “rent-seeking through quantity” effect implies that if 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 > 0, the political 
optimum will lead to a GI region which is inefficiently small, and the gap will increase to the 
extent that producers have greater lobbying power. 
 Compared to the neutral case, we see that if demand decreases clockwise with decreases 
in quality, the political equilibrium with 𝛼𝐼 = 𝛼𝑂 > 0 will definitely generate a GI region that is 
inefficiently small. A clockwise decrease in demand implies that a decrease in quality has a 
greater effect on prices than on consumer utility. On the other hand, if demand decreases 
counterclockwise, the “rent-seeking through quantity” effect is counteracted by the “rent-seeking 
through quality” effect. If the quality effect proves strong enough, the political equilibrium may 
lead to an inefficiently large GI region. This will be the case if a decrease in quality has only a 
small effect on price but a large effect on consumer utility.  
Discussion 
In this section we discuss a number of issues not explicitly dealt with in our model. A first issue 
concerns the effects of an expansion of the GI region on the production and consumption of the 
good produced by the outsiders. A second issue is how international trade might affect the 
results. Finally, we consider what happens if changes in quality are discontinuous. 
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Interaction with Non-GI Production 
Our model implicitly ignores what happens outside the GI region and assumes that the expansion 
of the GI region does not affect producer or consumer welfare in the market for the low-quality 
product made outside the GI region.  
In general, interactions between the high-quality production of the GI region and the low-
quality production outside the GI region can occur through substitutions on the supply side or on 
the demand side. On the supply side, expanding the GI region would decrease the production of 
the low-quality product, which would ceteris paribus raise the price of the low-quality product. 
On the demand side, an increased supply of high-quality products would induce a substitution 
away from low-quality products. This translates into a leftward shift of the demand curve for 
low-quality products which, ceteris paribus, would decrease the price of the low-quality product. 
The net effect in the low-quality market is thus ambiguous and would depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the substitution effect on the supply side and on the demand side. A priori, it is 
hard to make definite statements about this, especially since the expansion of the GI area reduces 
average quality in our model, which in turn affects the demand in both markets.  
On the supply side, our basic setup assumes that there is an outside option with a payoff 
normalized to zero. The implicit assumption here is that changes in the GI area (and hence in the 
quantity of both the high-quality and low-quality product) do not affect the price of low-quality 
products. This would be the case, for instance, if the low-quality product is a commodity traded 
at world prices and supplied by a perfectly competitive industry where free entry has driven 
profits down to zero. This is consistent with the approach in the existing literature. In the seminal 
paper of Moschini et al. (2008), there are constant marginal costs at the industry level in the 
production of both the high-quality and low-quality product. Hence, the introduction of the GI 
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region does not affect the price of the low-quality product in their setting. Moreover, since in 
their basic setup all firms are identical and produce at the minimum efficient scale, there are no 
profits whether for high-quality or for low-quality production. The welfare effect of introducing 
the GI region operates solely through the gains in consumer surplus.15 
On the demand side, we focus only on consumer utility and expenditures related to the GI 
product. While such a partial equilibrium approach is commonly used, it is true that this ignores 
substitution effects. To the extent that the introduction or expansion of the GI region leads to a 
substitution away from low-quality products, this implies that our current measure of consumer 
surplus would tend to overstate the net gains to consumers. This is a limitation of our approach. 
One way to overcome this limitation would be to model more explicitly the interaction on 
the consumer side between the low-quality and high-quality product. For instance, this is the 
approach taken by Moschini et al. (2008), who use a Mussa-Rosen demand specification which 
allows them to explicitly identify the net gains in consumer surplus as being due to the switch by 
some consumers from low-quality to high-quality products. On the other hand, the drawback of 
this approach is that it imposes certain assumptions on demand. In particular, consumers are 
assumed to buy at most one unit. In the scenario considered by Moschini et al. (2008), the 
introduction of the GI good thus crowds out an equivalent volume of low-quality products 
                                                          
15
 In an extension of their basic model, Moschini et al. (2008) do allow for upward-sloping supply curves, 
distinguishing two scenarios. However, in neither of these scenarios does the introduction of the GI region lead to a 
change in the price of the low-quality product. In the first scenario, production (whether high-quality or low-quality) 
is characterized by an upward sloping supply curve due to firm heterogeneity in efficiency. In this scenario, the 
producer surplus is the same regardless of whether the GI region is introduced or not, and the price of the low-
quality product is not affected. In the second scenario, production costs are constant at the industry level, but the 
production of quality is characterized by an upward sloping supply curve (e.g. because of specialized inputs in 
scarce supply, such as land). In this scenario, the introduction of the GI area creates producer surplus, but the 
introduction of the GI area again does not affect the price of the low-quality product. Thus, even these extensions to 
the Moschini et al. (2008) model abstract from any effect on the price of low-quality products from the introduction 
of high-quality production. In particular, the second scenario is similar to our setup where producers in the GI region 
obtain profits because free entry is restricted. In reality, these profits will tend to get capitalized in land values. 
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without, however, affecting the price of the low-quality good. In short, in the Mussa-Rosen 
specification used by Moschini et al. (2008) there is no increase in the total market size 
(measured in volume terms) after the introduction of the GI good. This may overstate the extent 
of the substitution effects and may thus understate the gains in consumer surplus from the 
introduction of the GI region.  
In summary, while in reality substitution effects on the demand side and on the supply 
side may exist, the present analysis has focused on a partial equilibrium model abstracting from 
these complications. Extending the analysis to take into account the substitution effects would 
require the use of explicit functional forms, which in turn have limitations.  
International Trade 
The present model does not distinguish between domestic and foreign consumers of the GI 
product. Adding trade to the model would lead to several interesting implications. Assuming the 
GI region has market power in world markets would create the possibility of extracting “rents” 
from foreign consumers, and the question of setting the GI region would then have some 
similarities to the question of setting an optimal tariff in the large-country scenario. As an 
example, the Champagne region presumably has market power outside France. The optimal area 
of the Champagne region (and the corresponding quantity and quality of Champagne) from the 
point of view of French national welfare would try to maximize the revenues obtained abroad, 
while balancing this against potential negative effects on the welfare of domestic consumers. 
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Discontinuous Changes in Quality 
The model so far assumed a continuous quality function as a convenient way to represent the 
“quality effect”. In reality, the conditions (such as soil quality) which create “terroir” may 
change more abruptly. However, this does not alter the main mechanisms of the model. 
Assume, for instance, that there is a core region with high intrinsic quality, with a 
discontinuous break at a certain point ?̂? beyond which lies a surrounding area with much lower 
intrinsic quality. For simplicity, we assume that both the high quality and the low quality are 
constant. In this scenario, the quality function 𝜎(𝑖) denoting the intrinsic quality at distance 𝑖 is 
no longer continuous and decreasing. Rather, the quality function becomes a step function, as 
shown in Figure 5. Given that consumers cannot identify particular producers inside the region, 
what matters for our analysis is how a change in total area affects average quality. Even with a 
discontinuous quality function 𝜎(𝑖) the average quality function s(𝑥), denoting the average 
quality in a given area 𝑥, is continuous (since we assume a continuum of producers). But the 
derivative of average quality with respect to the size of the area sx (which plays an important role 
in our analysis) will be discontinuous. 
This does not dramatically affect our results, although the discontinuity implies that we 
need to be careful in determining the optima. We demonstrate this in the bottom panel of Figure 
5, where we derive the social optimum for this scenario. Since 𝑠𝑥 discontinuously jumps from 
zero to a negative value at ?̂?, the negative utility effect 𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 has a similar discontinuous jump. 
Moreover, the equilibrium price of the GI product 𝑝 will also have a ‘kink’ at ?̂?. If 𝑝 − 𝑐 and 
−𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑥 intersect to the left or to the right of ?̂?, there is no problem. However, it is possible that 
the two curves do not intersect, but that 𝑝 − 𝑐 passes through the discontinuity. In this case, the 
optimum is ?̂? and the border of the GI region coincides with the natural discontinuity in quality. 
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This is by no means necessary; it is still perfectly possible that the socially optimal area is 
smaller or larger than this area. But the discontinuity at ?̂? has some significance. In particular, 
imagine that we shift the 𝑝 − 𝑐 curve vertically by varying the marginal cost 𝑐 of the GI region. 
It is clear that there will now be a range of values for 𝑐 for which ?̂? is the social optimum. 
Moreover, the larger the gap between the quality levels on both sides of ?̂?, the larger will be the 
jump in −𝑢𝑠sx and the more likely it becomes that the discontinuity will be the social optimum. 
Similar analyses can be made for the optimum of producers, insiders and outsiders, and the 
political equilibrium. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed a theoretical model to study both the socially optimal size of a GI 
area and the likely outcome if the area is decided by a government which is possibly susceptible 
to lobbying. Our analysis started from four assumptions. First, an expansion of the GI area 
increases total production which depresses the price of the product. Second, expansion allows the 
fixed costs of managing a GI area (e.g. marketing) to be spread over a larger production volume. 
Third, the expansion of the GI area may have a negative effect on (actual or perceived) quality, 
which would reduce consumers’ willingness to pay. Fourth, the area of a GI region is set by 
governments, which can be influenced by interest groups. 
 We showed that the social optimum is determined by a trade-off between the positive 
effect on consumer utility of extra production, the negative effect on consumer utility of lower 
quality, and the marginal cost of operating the GI region. The social optimum implies that prices 
will be greater than this marginal cost if there is a quality effect. However, the social optimum 
may also imply that this markup is not sufficient for producers to recover their fixed costs. 
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Our analysis of the political equilibrium emphasizes the existence of two interest groups 
– insiders and outsiders. If the government aims to maximize aggregate producer surplus, the 
size of the GI region may be smaller or larger than the social optimum depending on two effects. 
The “rent seeking through quality” effect may induce either a smaller or a larger area than the 
social optimum, as producers take into account the effect of quality on prices and not on 
consumer utility. The “rent seeking through quantity” effect will always induce a smaller area. 
Whether the resulting area is larger or smaller thus depends on the sign of the “rent seeking 
through quality” effect and/or the relative magnitude of both effects. If the government aims to 
maximize insider welfare, the resulting area will be smaller than that which maximizes aggregate 
producer welfare. By contrast, if the government maximizes outsider welfare, the result is an 
“open access” equilibrium where rents are driven down to the point at which they just cover 
fixed costs.  
Our analysis of the political equilibrium showed that in general the resulting GI area will 
be bounded by these four optima (for aggregate producer welfare, insider welfare, outsider 
welfare and social welfare). The political equilibrium will generally not coincide with the social 
optimum. Compared to the aggregate producer optimum, the insider optimum and the outsider 
optimum, the social optimum may be smaller than all three, larger than all three, or somewhere 
in between, depending on how a change in quality affects prices and consumer utility. 
 The theoretical model developed in this paper leads to a number of policy implications. 
First, the size of existing GI areas cannot simply be assumed to be optimal. Depending on the 
specifics of the situation, an existing GI area may be too small or too large from a social point of 
view. Second, the optimal size of a GI area is not merely a technical question. In recent years, 
European countries have modernized the process for applying for GI status by requiring that 
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teams of experts study the requests, for instance by carefully studying whether the geology is 
suitable for certain wines. Our analysis shows that even if such a procedure is done without 
interference by interest groups, the technical outcome will be inefficient from a social point of 
view if consumer preferences are not taken into account. Third, proposals by producer groups 
regarding the size of GI areas should be evaluated critically to study the extent to which the 
proposed area deviates from the social optimum because of rent-seeking through quantity and/or 
rent-seeking through quality.  
Importantly, the theoretical framework developed here points to the need to understand 
how changes in (actual or perceived) quality affect consumer utility compared to the effect of 
quality on prices. Without an understanding of the impact of quality changes on consumer utility, 
it is in general not possible to correctly evaluate existing GI areas or proposals for new GI areas. 
It may be possible, however, to use experimental or survey methods to estimate consumers’ 
willingness to pay for different quality levels associated with the GI region. To the extent that 
such studies shed light on the valuations of inframarginal consumers, they could be included in 
the technical analysis of proposals for the introduction or expansion of GIs. 
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Appendix. Side Payments from Outsiders to Insiders 
Assume that outsiders can make side payments to the existing producers, in effect “buying” their 
entry into the GI region (or more precisely buying the insiders’ support for an expansion). In this 
case, potential entrants would be willing to pay up to their profits 𝑝 − 𝑐 −
𝐹
𝑥
. The first order 
condition of the existing producers, deciding upon an expansion, then becomes 
 
𝜕Π𝐼
𝜕𝑥
= (𝑝 − 𝑐) + 𝑥(𝑝𝑥 + 𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑥) = 0  
This is exactly the same first order condition as that which maximizes aggregate producer 
welfare (equation (15)). The result is intuitive: if potential entrants can make side payments, the 
existing producers will internalize the positive effect of increased revenues for these new 
producers. The possibility of side payments makes the GI organization behave as if it maximized 
aggregate producer welfare instead of the welfare of the existing producers.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Socially optimal size of the GI region 
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Figure 2. Optimal size of the GI region for aggregate producer surplus 
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Figure 3. Optimal size of the GI region for insiders and for outsiders 
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Figure 4. Determination of the Political Equilibrium 
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Figure 5. Discontinuous Changes in Quality 
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